The Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Kuwait: Problems and Solutions by Alqattan, Mohammad E A et al.
1 
The Il legal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Kuwait: Problems 
and Solutions 
Short title: 
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Abstract: 
Kuwait is a country with an emerging economy that could benefit hugely from 
investment in its marine fisheries production.  However, the country is 
constrained by several problems which affect the health of its coastal fish 
stocks. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is the most serious of 
these problems because it reduces fish stock levels. In this study, we analyze 
IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters, and assess its impact on fish stock levels and 
consequent damage to the marine economy and environment, as well as its 
implications for the security system and the integrity of governance in the 
country. The research methods used in this study include key informant 
interviews, information obtained from some illegal fishers themselves, 
documentary data collected from Kuwaiti public authorities, and peer-reviewed 
literature. . The main finding of the study is that IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters 
not only threatens the health of the country’s marine fish biomass but raises 
questions about Kuwait’s immigration policy, the effectiveness of its border 
controls, and the way its decision-making processes are manipulated by groups 
who influence decision-making and large private companies which break fishing 
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Published literature reports that fish stocks in Kuwaiti waters are in 
decline. Al-Foudari  [1] and Al-Husaini  [2] state there has been a steady 
decrease in fish biomass in Kuwait since the 1980s [3], especially in the 
shrimp species [4-6] and [7].  Overfishing and Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated [IUU] fishing are frequently mentioned as causes of this decline, 
and the media have frequently rehearsed the problem, based on complaints 
from the public in Kuwait about  the increase in prices of seafood, especially 
finfish, due to lack of supply. Calderwood [8]  claimed that “the Kuwaiti sea 
has become almost dead because of the overfishing”. KUNA [9] stated that 
“IUU fishing is threatening the marine ecosystem in Kuwait and declining the 
Kuwaiti fish stock, which needs to be addressed by the Kuwaiti government 
immediately”. It is widely believed that Kuwait, along with all the Arabian Gulf 
Counties, except the UAE, under-reports its total catches, and that the 
unreported catches are due to IUU fishing activities [10]. It seems that, 
based on the large number of IUU fishing cases, the Kuwaiti government’s 
responses are insufficient to counter IUU fishing [11]. 
Berkes et al. [12] stated that there is a link between the pressure on 
the marine wealth and the increase of fish prices, which could prompt 
consumers to seek an alternative source of protein (see also Alshubairi et al. 
[13].  The perceived consequences of IUU fishing - higher fish prices and a 
decline in fish stocks – have not yet caused a crisis in the marine food supply 
chain, as Kuwaiti merchants can still afford to import fish from international 
markets. But the unprotected waters and the wider violations of fishery 
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regulations could lead to a further spread of crime, such as piracy,  as 
indicated by Weldemichael [14] who noted that  Somali piracy began   as a 
direct response to illegal fishing. Moreover,  if the level of IUU fishing 
increases, and if international supplies are not forthcoming, there could be a 
major threat to food security Kuwait.  There are two further security issues: 
violence and immigration. In terms of violence, as stated by the Al-Qabas 
Newspaper [15], the harm inflicted by IUU fishers has included violence 
committed by illegal fishers against officers of Kuwait’s Fishery Protection 
Authority (FPA). Immigration is a highly sensitive issue in Kuwait, not least 
because 70% of the population is made up of immigrants, and recent 
research states that a lack of immigration control is the primary cause of 
increased crime and environmental damage, including pollution [16-18]. Most 
of the interviewees in the present study assert that illegal immigrant fishers 
are responsible for most of the illegal fishing in Kuwait, and the official 
statistics of IUU fishing in Kuwait show that almost half of the illegal fishing 
activities in Kuwait are conducted by non-Kuwaiti illegal fishers (see Table 3).  
Kuwait has a serious problem in controlling the number of immigrants, and 
this problem impacts all sectors in Kuwait, including the fishery. If Kuwait 
continues to turn a blind eye to immigration control, IUU fishing will continue 
to increase, causing further damage to fish stocks. Some commentators have 
begun to characterise the IUU threat in terms of environmental terrorism. 
Schwartz [19] stated there are eight categories of environmental terrorism, 
one of which could be applied to IUU fishing in Kuwait i.e. category 5, which 
refers to acts or threats of environmental destruction that are deliberate, 
not merely symbolic, and occur during peacetime. In our view, research into 
5 
 
IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters is long overdue, and currently urgent, if 
sustainable management of its fisheries is to be achieved. 
The main research questions of this study are: What is the extent of 
IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters? How damaging is it to the country’s fish 
stocks? Who is responsible for this IUU fishing? How aware of IUU fishing are 
the government, citizens, media, companies and individuals? What measures 
have been taken to combat it? How effective are these measures? What 
more could be done to eliminate IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters? Are there 
wider implications of the IUU fishing problem for the Kuwaiti system of 
governance? The remaining sections of this paper present  an outline of fish 
stocks and fishers in Kuwaiti waters; the methods used by the study to 
obtain data; the results of the fieldwork; a discussion of these results; and a 
concluding summary of the findings and their wider implications for achieving 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14 [20]. First, however, we 
examine the meaning of the concept of IUU fishing. 
 
2. The concept of IUU fishing 
	
The concept of ‘illegal, unreported and unregulated’ (IUU) fishing refers 
to one of the most serious  threats to the global marine ecosystem and  fish 
stocks worldwide. According to the FAO [21], IUU fishing “across the world’s 
oceans weighs in at around 11–26 million tonnes of fish each year or a price 
tag of US$10–23 billion”. Illegal fishers take advantage of weak and corrupt  
regimes to conduct illegal fishing in their coastal waters [22]. According to 




2.1  The definition of IUU fishing 
	
The definition of IUU fishing used by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) addresses three categories of IUU 
fishing: “1. ILLEGAL FISHING refers to fishing activities conducted by foreign 
vessels without permission in waters under the jurisdiction of another state, 
or which contravene its fisheries law and regulations in some other manner; 
2. UNREPORTED FISHING refers to fishing that is not officially recorded; and 
3. UNREGULATED FISHING refers to fishing activities in areas where there are 
no applicable management measures to regulate the catch” [24]. IUU fishing 
includes  “1. Fishing and fishing-related activities conducted in contravention 
of national, regional and international laws; 2. Non-reporting, misreporting or 
under- reporting of information on fishing operations and their catches; 3. 
Fishing by “Stateless” vessels; 4. Fishing in conventional areas of Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) by non-party vessels; 5. Fishing 
activities which are not regulated by States and cannot be easily monitored 
and accounted for” [22].  Kuwaiti law and regulations define IUU fishing 
according to the FAO’s definition [25] and [26], since Kuwait is a party to 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement [23].  
 




As stated by MRAG [27] during the 1950s, industrial-scale fishing 
began with the Soviet Union’s distant water fishing fleets, followed in the 
1970s by similar fleets from East Asia, Europe, and the USA. Before the 
legitimising of countries’ 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) by 
UNCLOS in 1982, and the establishment, from the 1960s onwards, of 
regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) to regulate high seas 
fishing species quotas, such industrial-scale fishing was unregulated and 
unreported, but then it also became illegal, and classified as IUU. According 
to Al-Sharrad [3], IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters began in the late 1960s, 
perpetrated by vessels from Iran and Saudi Arabia that targeted shrimp with 
illegal trolling gear, and since the 1990s, the total fish stocks have declined 
from a peak of 8.5m kgs in 1995 to 5.5m kgs in 2016 (see Figure 1). 
 
2.3  How damaging is IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters? 
	
KUNA [9] reports that IUU fishing in Kuwait is reducing fish stock and 
marine biodiversity levels in Kuwaiti waters. The causes of the decline in fish 
stock levels is partly due to pollution and other factors, but IUU fishing and  
over-fishing, is playing a major role in the decline according to Al-Husaini et 
al. [2]. One effect of this decline is overpriced fish in Kuwait. The Arab Times 
[28] reported that “the over pricing of fish in Kuwait is significant and the 
Kuwaiti citizens cannot afford fish on their tables daily”. Al-Fuzai [29] claims 
this raises the issue of food security in Kuwait, in that it could put the 
nation’s supply of protein food at risk. Al-Baz [30] claims that fisheries’ 
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catches in Kuwait decreased by 41% in 2005 and recommends that fisheries 
must be reduced to allow stock recovery. Nithyanandan [31] stated that the 
Arabian Gulf suffers from serious shellfish and finfish decline, particularly in 
Kuwait, and one of the causes is  overfishing.  
	
3.  Fish stocks and fishers in Kuwaiti waters 
 
The main commercial shrimp and fish species in Kuwaiti waters are 
listed in Table 1. According to Al-Husaini et al. [2], more than 35% of the 
total fishery production in Kuwait depends on three species of shrimp - the 
Green tiger prawn (Penaeus semisulcatus), the Kiddi shrimp (Metapenaeus 
affinis) and the Jinga shrimp (Parapenaeopsis stylifera).  
The FAO [23] states that  fishery production in Kuwait is insignificant, 
yet  it is the country’s second industry  after oil. FAO states that the 
fisheries industry was stable between the period 2011-2013, with  annual 
production levels of 4,000 to 4,500 tonnes, but  production declined  after 
2015,  with only 370 people employed in 2015 compared to 3,500 engaged 
in fishing in 2013 (add ref)  
 
 
 From Figure 1, we can observe the production cycle in Kuwaiti waters 
and see that fish production was increasing from 1983 onwards (apart from 
1990-1991 during the first Gulf War) until it reached a peak in 1995 of 8.5 
million kgs. Since then it has gradually declined (with a few temporary spikes) 
to an average of between 4 and 5 million kgs. Al-Foudari  [1] claimed that 
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fish stock density in Kuwait declined by 53% between 2013 and 2014, but 
the fish production figures provided by CSB (Figure 1) show that the decline 
was only 20% and it recovered temporarily in 2016. The decline was 
particularly severe in two main finfish species: an 87% decline in Hilsa shad 
production; and an 85% decline in Silver Pomfret production. One of the main 
causes behind these declines, according to Al-Husaini et al. [2], was 
overfishing. 
Figure 2 shows that the number of fishers varies from year to year. 
This is because the number of immigrant fishers changes significantly over 
time because of amendments to Kuwaiti immigration regulations. 
 
Table 2 shows the nationality of each fisherman in Kuwaiti waters since 
2000. 
As we see in Table 2, the number of immigrant fishers, especially from 





4.  Methods 
	
The data collection in this study was carried out in four ways. First, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informant (KI) 
stakeholders in the fishing industry in Kuwait. The interviewees included a 
member  of the Kuwaiti coastguards (KI-6); , the  Kuwaiti Institute of 
Scientific Research (KISR) (KI-1);  the Department of Fishery Resources (DFR) 
(KI-8);  the Public Authority of Agriculture Affairs and Fish Resources 
(PAAAFR) (KI-7);  the Kuwaiti fishers’ community (KI-5);  a fishing company’s 
representative  (KI-9);  and fishers accused of illegal fishing activities (KI-2, 3 
and 4). The questions asked of the KI interviewees were designed to elicit 
the main causes of, responses to, and solutions for IUU fishing in Kuwaiti 
waters. Second, visits were made to all of the Kuwaiti islands, fishing areas, 
coasts and ports to take samples of water, sand and sediments; to check the 
existence of coastguards and fishery protection authorities; and to analyze 
the fishing activities in the areas. Third, a review of both peer-reviewed 
publications and the grey literature was undertaken to access studies of IUU 
fishing in general, and IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters in particular. Fourth, 
documentary materials held in Kuwait government archives were studied, 
including statistics of Kuwaiti fish stocks from the website of the Kuwaiti 
Central Statistical Bureau [32]; information from the Kuwaiti Fishery 
Protection Authority (FPA) on fish stock  health since 1983; official reports 
from authorities in Kuwait regarding IUU fishing; and transcripts of 
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proceedings in Kuwaiti court cases of IUU fishing which were  viewed at the 
Kuwaiti Al-Ruqaie court library. 
 
5. Results of the fieldwork 
	
This section presents the results obtained from the above methods of 
data collection. Most respondents (90%) agreed that during the last 30 
years there has been a decline in fish stocks in Kuwaiti waters, though 
PAAAFR claimed that  while there has  been a reduction in production 
compared to the  level in the 1980s, current production levels are now 
steady because of an increase in regulations in recent years (see Figure 1). 
 
5.1  Causes of declining stocks 
	
Most interviewees (KISR KI, illegal fishers and two Kuwaiti fishers) 
believed that the main cause of declining stocks is overfishing, especially by 
IUU trawlers, and that the second reason for the decline is pollution from 
factories and the discharge of sewage directly into the sea. Evidence of 
sewage outfalls can be seen on most of the beaches near cities such as 
Shuwaikh, Salmyia, and Fintas [33]. The lead researcher in this project visited 
most of the Kuwaiti coastlines, including all the Kuwaiti islands, and took 
water, sand and sediment samples, which contained traces of raw sewage 
waste (see the documentary video produced during this project [33]), and 
also studied water samples collected from several locations during summer 
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and winter in Kuwaiti waters [34], as shown in Figure 1. The conclusion 
reached was that, in these locations, E. coli exceeded international water 
quality standards by almost 100 times, resulting in persistent failures of 
microbial water quality standards because of high concentrations of faecal 
sterols, and that pollution from sewage in the Kuwaiti waters has resistance 
which exceeded the threshold of both Kuwait Environmental Public Authority 
(KEPA) standards and the European Union’s Coastal Bathing Water Directive 
(CBWD). However, a KISR interviewee claimed that 90% of the decline in fish 
stocks is not due to either IUU or pollution, but to high levels of  salinity 
caused by the Southeastern Anatolia project which has constructed twenty 
two water dams in Turkey since 2010 [35], as well as the water dam built on 
the Karun River by Iran in 2005 [36], which together have greatly reduced 
the amount of fresh water pouring into the Arabian Gulf through Shat Al-
Arab. The resulting increased salinity level has caused the fish to move away 
or die [37, see also 38, 39]. For its part, PAAAFR stated that the decline in 
fish stocks was mainly because of other environmental issues including global 
warming, the red tide or algal bloom phenomenon, and oil tanker discharges 
of ballast water [8]. 
 
5.2  Forms of IUU fishing 
	
The FPA interviewee (KI-7) said there were many forms of IUU fishing 
in Kuwaiti waters. The most serious forms were fishing with illegal large 
trawls and multi-fishing lines; fishing in illegal fishing areas such as the 
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Kuwaiti Bay; fishing with unlicensed boats; catching fish smaller than the 
authorized size; catching more fish than licensed (each licensed boat has a 
limited weight capacity but fishers catch more than those limits); fishing in 
non-seasonal times (including trawling during the breeding and spawning 
periods of fish growth); and unselectively catching everything and discarding 
dead and unwanted species. An example of illegal gear was described by one 
of the IUU fishers interviewed (KI-3) who said that he used multi-hook fishing 
lines which he bought from Egyptian fishers -  they were up to several miles 
in length with thousands of fishing hooks of different sizes attached, and 
caught huge numbers of fish (1 to 2 tonnes). Another IUU fisher (KI-2) said 
he had used a multi-hook fishing line for many years and the authorities have 
never caught him because this gear could not be easily seen. When the FPA 
or coastguards approached his boat, he cut the line and abandoned it at sea 
because it was cheap and could be easily replaced – a practice that leads to  
‘ghost fishing’ because fish continue to be caught on the hooks of the 
abandoned lines.   Another IUU fisher (KI-4) described his use of an illegal 
trawling gear called the Koofah, which most of the illegal trawling fishers in 
Kuwait used. It is a big solid net, which he made himself, and is attached to 
the boat’s stern which is dragged across the seabed. The boat moves slowly 
and the trawl gathers up everything in its path, damaging the coral reefs. The 
fisher said that the authorities never caught him with this gear because each 
time a patrol boat approached, he cut his net and threw it into the sea, 
recording its GPS position so he could come back to pick it up later. Most 
interviewees held that IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters is a serious problem, 
which has to be dealt with severely because it has caused the decline of fish 
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catches and therefore loss of their livelihoods – one  consequence of which 
has been that Kuwaiti fishers (especially large-scale fishers) have to travel to 
other countries’ waters, such as Oman, to continue fishing. 
 
5.3  Causes of IUU fishing 
	
There was disagreement over the causes of IUU fishing in Kuwaiti 
waters. All the interviewees perceived that the Kuwaiti laws for fishery 
protection were strict and sufficient, and they also believed that breaking 
these laws was damaging to marine life and to fish stock levels; however, 
they disagreed on why so many fishers violated the laws. An IUU fisher (KI-2) 
claimed that the authorities did not apply the law because most IUU fishers 
had connections with the authorities, meaning that their cases would be 
dropped later, and this made the law against IUU fishing useless. A similar 
allegation was that the big fishing companies in Kuwait did most of the IUU 
overfishing in Kuwaiti waters, but the authorities did not take action against 
them because the owners of those companies were thought to be either 
members of the powerful families or had connections with powerful people in 
Kuwait. Another allegation by KI-2 was that the FPA would not take action 
against IUU Kuwaiti fishers who agreed to vote for the ruling political party, 
but it threatened to apply the rules to IUU Kuwaiti fishers who voted for 
opposition parties.  KI-2 claimed that any arrested fisher who had a 
connection with someone in the FPA would have the charges against them 
dropped [40] – a claim  that KI-7 from the FPA denied, saying that when any 
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illegal fisher is accused he would be put through the legal system without any 
exceptions. 
KI -2 and KI-5 alleged the Kuwaiti authorities were not competent to 
prevent IUU fishing because recruitment to government posts in Kuwait was 
not based on merit or qualifications but on nepotism. The respondents 
asserted that most of the heads of these ministerial sectors were members 
of a powerful family who lacked knowledge and administrative and leadership 
skills, and that they recruited their favourites into their staff  who were also 
unqualified. Thus, it is claimed, most of the important government agencies 
in Kuwait were incapable of achieving their goals, including the PFA whose 
employees were not specialized in either fisheries or the marine environment, 
nor did they have leadership skills. Another explanation was put forward by 
the coastguard interviewee (KI-6) who said the laws and regulations were 
adequate, but lack of coordination between the different authorities in 
Kuwait meant that there was ineffective enforcement. In partial defense of 
the FPA, the Al-Qabas Newspaper [15] published a report, based on a 
statement from the FPA, that they faced considerable danger at sea from 
IUU fishers who used knives and sticks to threaten violence against them. 
According to this report, there are dozens of videos in the social media 
showing IUU fishers trying to crash FPA vessels with their fast boats, thereby 
putting officers’ lives in danger and causing serious damage to patrol craft. 
A different explanation put forward by an IUU fisher (KI-4) was that the 
fault lay primarily with foreign fishers. Dayem [40], a spokesperson for the 
Kuwaiti fishers, said the FPA failed to monitor landings at ports, and as a 
result, foreign fishers were allowed to catch and land any species they liked, 
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whether abundant or scarce. He also claimed that the FPA turned a blind eye 
to IUU Iranian fishers who sold their fish in Kuwaiti markets. Kuwaiti fishers 
and fishing companies pinned the blame on immigrant fishers from 
Bangladesh, India, Iran, and Egypt. For example, respondents KI-3 and 5 said 
immigrant illegal fishers from Egypt were the ones who really damaged the 
Kuwaiti fish stocks because they were numerous  and they did not care 
about the health of the marine environment. Other respondents (KI-3, 4 and 
5) claimed that foreign fishers from Iran and Iraq were the worst violators of 
the law of fisheries, and they escaped detention by speeding away, usually to 
the north of the Arabian Gulf near Boubyan Island where there was limited 
surveillance  so they could enter and exit Kuwaiti waters quickly. Other 
respondents (KI-2 and KI-3) blamed the environmental ignorance of fishers: 
although these respondents held that they themselves were aware of the 
harm inflicted on marine life by IUU fishing, they said that most IUU fishers 
were not. 
 
From all of the above we can conclude that the core cause of the IUU fishing 
and the overfishing is the lack of enforcement  the laws and regulations. The 
lack of immigration enforcement caused the increase of uncontrolled fishers;  
the lack of marine protection enforcement caused the spread of marine 
violations in the Kuwaiti waters, and  the lack of fish market control allowed 
IUU fishers to dispose of their illegal catches  
 




All fishers, including IUU fishers, stated that the authorities’ responses 
to IUU fishing in Kuwaiti waters were ineffective because of limited levels of 
patrolling.  One reason for this limited patrolling,  mentioned by KI-4, is  that 
the FPA is constrained by weather conditions: in rough weather officers  do 
not go out to sea, so illegal fishers make use of bad weather times as an 
opportunity to carry out illegal fishing. In addition to the other reasons put 
forward by fishers as to the ineffectiveness of the FPA (already mentioned in 
section 4.3), a further charge made by KI-1 was the FPA’s failure to report 
and record all incidents of violence used against FPA officers by illegal 
fishers, which meant that the full extent of the IUU problem was not visible. 
The FPA denied this charge and claimed they did keep records of tickets 
issued for illegal fishing (see Table 3). From Table 3 we can see that the total 
number of tickets issued for IUU fishing between 2001 and 2017 was 9,755, 
meaning that the FPA issued an average of 573.8 tickets per year, which is 
three tickets every two days. The proportion of IUU offences committed by 
immigrant fishers was 53%, and by Kuwaiti fishers was 45%. Appendix B 
contains a detailed table listing all the tickets issued.  
 
5.5  Respondents’ recommendations for ending IUU fishing in 
Kuwaiti waters 
	
The most common recommendations for ending or containing IUU 
fishing in the Kuwaiti waters made by respondents involved technical 
solutions. For example, several respondents (including KI-1, 5 and 6) 
suggested installing satellite monitoring systems in Kuwaiti waters to observe 
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all fishing and IUU fishing activities. The coastguard’s respondent KI-6 
recommended installing the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on all 
boats in Kuwait [41], so that if  the fisher switches the AIS off,  the RADAR 
would detect a vessel  with no AIS, which would be considered  as suspicious, 
and this would alert the authotiies to a possible case of IUU.  One use of such 
satellite technology would be to take pictures of IUU fishers so they would 
not escape arrest by cutting away their illegal fishing gears at sea [42]. KI-5 
recommended that a radar system should be employed to record a boat’s 
track in order to find out where a fisherman cut loose the trawl. Radar would 
also record if a boat was moving slowly within a steady course, and this 
would indicate that it was towing something heavy like a trawl net. The use 
of underwater technologies such as SONARs and hydrophones to detect 
trawlers or any other illegal activities was proposed by Alwali [43], while 
Oozeki et al. [44] suggested establishing stationary ships or jetties at sea to 
give the authorities more visual advantage in detecting IUU fishing. 
KISR interviewee KI-1 suggested another technical solution – 
monitoring fish stocks by applying biological reference points to check for 
changes in fish stock biomass, so if a low level of biomass was recorded, 
fishing would have to be suspended in real time. KISR KI-8 and fish market 
analyst KI- 9 suggested that if such monitoring were to be undertaken now, 
it would lead to an immediate suspension of all fishing in Kuwaiti waters for 
at least five years, to allow for fish recovery. The KISR interviewee KI-1 and 
several fisher interviewees (KI-2, 3, 4 and 5) proposed adding another 
monitoring tool by collecting data from fishermen at all fish markets and 
ships to calculate exactly the amount of fish they caught every day. If a 
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fisherman was not adhering to his allocated share of fish, or was providing 
false data, the FPA would withdraw his license. The KISR respondents KI-1 
and KI-8, the coastguard KI-6, and the PAAAFR interviewee KI-7 
recommended recording all fishing activities, transportation of products, and 
sea travel voyages in Kuwaiti waters, by requiring log books to be kept by 
fishermen, markets, and processing factories in order to check that landing 
data were accurate.  Illegal fishers KI-2, KI-3, and KI were in favor of sudden 
inspections at sea and at harbors and ports to spot check the types of fish, 
weight, length and amount caught and landed, because this would help 
significantly to track illegal activities at sea and deter fishers from such 
activities. They also recommended the installation of stationary hubs at all 
the fishing areas in Kuwait to function 24 hours every day, thereby 
preventing the fishery authorities from using the excuse of bad weather to 
stop monitoring the fisheries. Another technical solution they suggested was 
to check whether a vessel was capable of towing trawling nets, and if it was, 
to decline issuing it a fishing license. Other recommendations were for policy 
measures rather than technical solutions. For example, the KISR respondent 
K-1, fishery expert KI-10, and several fishers (KI-3, KI-4 and KI-5) suggested 
imposing a moratorium on fishing in Kuwaiti waters for particular species until 
their biomass recovered, while the PAAAFR respondent KI-7 recommended 
banning all fishing in Kuwaiti waters for two years to allow the stocks to 
recover [8]. To overcome the resulting fish shortage, the importing of fish 
from Iran, Saudi Arabia and other regional suppliers was proposed by fishers 
and KISR. Another policy solution was to monitor more closely the level of 
immigration into Kuwait (KI-2, KI-3 and KI-5). The coastguard KI–6 and two  
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fishers (KI-3 and KI-5) suggested increasing the punishments for IUU fishing 
in Kuwait to include not only financial penalties but also deportation of 
immigrant illegal fishers. Some illegal fishers (KI-2 and KI-4) recommended an 
end to the policy of giving fishing licenses to immigrants. They also said that 
since most fishers are not environmentally aware, and are ignorant of fishery 
protection law and regulations, they should be made to attend workshops to 
educate them about the harmful consequences of IUU fishing before being 
issued with fishing permits, quotas, and vessel licenses. Also, the 
government should start a major media campaign to educate the public 
about the consequences of illegal fishing and its damage to fish stocks. KI-2 
and KI-4 also said that, since they could easily buy illegal fishing gears from 
Kuwait fishing shops or online, the government should take action to monitor 
and control such outlets. To reduce the use of violence by illegal fishers 
against FPA employees, coastguard KI-6, fishers KI-3 and KI-5 and illegal 
fishers KI-2 and KI-4 urged the government to increase the number of 
environmental police officers and qualified employees in the FPA. Finally, 
coastguard interviewee KI-6 argued for increased coordination between 











There are six  issues raised by the results section that warrant 
discussion. First, the fieldwork confirmed the claims made in the published 
literature that fish stocks in Kuwaiti waters have been in decline for many 
years. All respondents alluded to this decline, and CSB [32] reported it in 
figures that go back to 1983 which showed a rise in landings from 1983 to a 
peak in 1995, followed by a fall back to 1983 levels by 2015.  
Second, the fieldwork shows there was far less consensus on the cause 
of this decline. Some respondents attributed it to excessive fishing efforts by 
all fishers. Others blamed IUU fishing, including the use of damaging gear 
such as very long lines or small mesh nets. For some respondents the main 
cause was IUU trawling by foreigners, especially Egyptians and Iranians. 
Alternative or complementary explanations by KISR, PAAAFR interviewees 
and literature included  pollution from land-based sewerage discharges [45]; 
increased salinity caused by dams built by Turkey and Iran on rivers flowing 
into Kuwaiti waters [46]; global warming [47]; and algal bloom. In our view, 
the crucial cause is overfishing, which is exacerbated by IUU fishing carried 
out  by both domestic and foreign companies. KISR’s reluctance to blame IUU 
fishing and instead to claim that 90% of the decline was caused by high 
levels of  salinity, is partly because the data obtained by the FPA on IUU 
fishing is incomplete. The FPA and the coastguards only pursue individual IUU 
fishers at sea; they do not pursue the huge company trawlers, because, 
according to respondents, these companies are owned by powerful people 
who are effectively beyond the law. Also, fishers  who come from Iraq or Iraq 
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and carry out IUU fishing, escape back to their own countries, so their 
violations are not reported. Therefore, we cannot assess the full extent of 
IUU fishing from the statistics provided by the FPA because these statistics 
do not provide a full  picture. Our findings indicate that the overall perception 
is that IUU fishing is much more damaging to the fish stocks in Kuwait than 
the FPA is prepared to acknowledge. However, empirical evidence is required 
to substantiate this observation.  
Third, the claim that foreign fishers are responsible for most of the IUU 
fishing is exaggerated. Dayem [40] and Kuwaiti fishers noted that immigrant 
fishers, especially from Bangladesh and Egypt, were the main perpetrators of 
IUU fishing in Kuwait, taking advantage of poor immigration control. This 
charge resonates in the Kuwaiti media and parliament, which recently warned 
the government about the threat posed by immigration to the country’s 
population balance [17]. According to the World’s Population Review [18], 
the Kuwaiti population in 2018 is 4.2 million, of which 30% are Kuwaitis and 
70% are non-Kuwaitis. These statistics are reflected in the number of fishers: 
Table 2 (active fishers) shows that immigrant fishers (Indians and Egyptians) 
are the majority of all fishers over all years, while the minority of fishers are 
the licensed Kuwaiti fishers. However, by looking at Table 3 (the fishing 
tickets issued against illegal fishers) we note that almost half of the 
violations have been perpetrated by Kuwaiti fishers. If these figures are 
accurate, they show that in 2017, four licensed Kuwaiti fishers committed 
112 offences (an average of eight offences per fisher), whereas 614 licensed 
non-Kuwaiti fishers committed 371 offences (an average of 0.6 offences per 
fisher). Even if there is some inaccuracy in these figures, they suggest that 
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blaming foreigners for the bulk of IUU is wide of the mark. The coastguard 
interviewee stated that Kuwaiti fishers are no better than immigrant fishers 
at looking after the marine environment. So, even if the Kuwait government 
enforced more restrictions on immigrant fishers, there would still be a 
considerable amount of IUU fishing committed by Kuwaiti fishers.  
Fourth, the fieldwork cast another doubt on the veracity of the FPA 
figures in Table 3. From that table, we are told that the FPA issued 9,755  
 for illegal fishing during a period of 16 years. This is an average of 609.7 
illegal fishing incidents recorded every year, which seems excessive, but 
given that most fisher interviewees said they rarely see FPA vessels at sea, 
and all the illegal fisher interviewees said they had never been caught by the 
authorities, the number of IUU fishing incidents that the FPA did not report is 
likely to have been substantial. This shortfall of the FPA is partly explained by 
its prioritization of safety at sea over fishery monitoring. The coastguard 
interviewee stated that the primary role of the FPA is security and safety, 
and IUU fishing investigations constitute a secondary role for them, so in 
rough weather conditions the coastguards give more attention to SOS signals 
than to observing IUU fishing. With regard to the role of the Kuwaiti 
coastguards, their top priority is security, as the conflicts have increased 
between Iran and GCC countries [48], and IUU fishing is not considered by 
them to be a security issue.  
Fifth, the fieldwork demonstrated that fishers in Kuwaiti waters will 
always find a way to circumvent the law, employing  various  types of gear to 
catch as much as they can without being caught, even using the threat of 
violence against the authorities in order to avoid arrest [49]. This suggests 
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that simply using force against IUU fishers is unlikely to work because the 
problem has many dimensions, including lack of  education, weak immigration 
control,  poor monitoring mechanisms, and a culture of corruption,  and each 
dimension needs to be addressed. For example, the last dimension – culture 
of corruption – is especially important  since, even if AIS systems are 
installed on all vessels  and the FPA obtains reliable data on IUU fishing, 
prosecuting offenders may  be thwarted if guilty fishers use connections with 
authorities to remove accusations against them. It is true that during 2014-
2015, when the Indonesian government employed AIS and the Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS) to counter IUU, the result was a decrease of 42% 
in IUU fishing [50]. But unlike Indonesia, some IUU fishers in Kuwaiti waters 
are perceived to be protected by prominent figures with influence over the 
judiciary.  Moreover, the fieldwork elicited several allegations of other kinds 
of corruption in Kuwait’s system of fisheries governance. For example,  
fishers, including IUU fishers, claimed  that the FPA turned a blind eye to 
Kuwaiti IUU fishers who voted for the government party in the elections; that 
several large companies and powerful family members carried out IUU 
trawling fishing in Kuwait with immunity from prosecution; that these 
privileged figures also controlled fish prices in the markets; and that the staff 
of the FPA were recruited by nepotism not merit. Although not all these 
claims can be supported by corroborative evidence, the frequency of their 
expression by so many respondents convinced us that they point to a serious 
issue for fisheries management in Kuwait, potentially undermining not only 
the health of its fish stocks, but also the rule of law and the principle of 
democracy in the country [51]. Some voices in the country began raising 
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these wider issues in the parliament 11 years ago [52]. 
Sixth,  the fieldwork revealed that violence was used against the FPA 
by some IUU fishers to resist arrest at sea. The coastguard’s interviewee 
noted that IUU fishers did not use violence against coastguards because they 
had weapons, whereas the FPA did not carry weapons. One of the fisher 
interviewees explained that the IUU fishers did not respect the law against 
violence either because they or their sponsors were protected from 
prosecution by powerful insiders or because they enter Kuwaiti waters 
illegally with fast vessels and can escape arrest by fleeing to Iran or Iraq.  But 
there is a wider issue here - increasing violence against the marine authorities 
in Kuwait reflects a disturbing pattern of a rise in  violence on the country’s 
mainland. El-Garem and Ismail [53] stated that “the Kuwaiti youth adopted 
violence after the Iraqi invasion of 1990”, and OSAC [16] reported that the 
crime rate in general is increasing in Kuwait. Perhaps IUU fishing is a symptom 




This study indicates that, like so many other emerging economies, 
Kuwait is experiencing a serious threat from IUU fishing to its coastal fish 
stocks. Although respondents are divided about the extent to which other 
factors (such as pollution, water salinity, climate change and algal blooms) 
are also responsible, most interviewees perceive that IUU fishing is the main 
cause. But IUU fishing has many forms, and it is not clear which forms are the 
most damaging to stocks in Kuwait. Empirical scientific evidence is needed to 
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determine, for example, whether trawl nets deplete the stocks at a faster 
rate than do long-lines, so that authorities can more effectively target their 
monitoring and enforcement efforts [54]. The main causes of the IUU fishing 
in Kuwait is the lack of  enforcement of fisheries law;  the failure to   monitor  
immigration;  and the lack of control over  the fish markets which provide an 
outlet for illegal fish. .  It is likely that similar problems are experienced by 
other coastal states in the Gulf, and as stated by Alshubairi [13], the first 
step needed in the GCC region to combat IUU fishing is to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of coastal policing  and  encourage participation  
in regional and global marine  protection organisations. . Kuwait must engage 
in marine protection activities in the GCC by integrating departments of the 
navy and coastguard in the region, with a mission to combat illegal fishing 
and other activities which damage the ecosystems. 
Research into the effect of fishing moratoria is also necessary  (Hoag) 
[55], as is  research to clarify whether foreign IUU fishing is a greater threat 
to stocks than is Kuwaiti IUU fishing. Also, the government should provide 
more resources for both data collection and enforcement operations, 
including measures to integrate the existing agencies [56]. The government 
should take more action to punish the sponsors of fishers who engage in IUU 
fishing by banning their business operations in Kuwaiti waters. Above all, 
however, the government must address the problem of perceived corrupt 
judicial proceedings whereby IUU Kuwaiti fishers can escape prosecution for 
damaging the fish stocksKuwait is not alone in facing the fact that corrupt 
practices threaten to undermine its coastal fish resources: for example, many 
West African countries, including Sierra Leone, are in a similar position. 
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Unless the governments in such countries have the courage and political will 
to end corruption, they may find that not only do they put their fish stocks 




Appendix A. A film was made from evidence supplied by Kuwaiti armed 
forces units and naval ships [33]. 
Appendix B. Details of illegal tickets issued by the Kuwaiti FPA from 2000 
to 2017. 
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Table 1. The main commercial shrimp and finfish species in Kuwait 
(Source: [2]. 








2 Metapenaeus affinis (Penaeidae) Jinga shrimp Shahameyah 





Silver pomfret Zobaidy 






7 Pomadasys kaakan (Haemulidae) Javelin grunter Nagroor 
8 Otolithes ruber (Sciaenidae) Tigertooth 
croaker 
Newaiby 








11 Scomberomorus commerson 
Scombridae) 
Kingfish Chanaad 










14 Platycephalus indicus 
(Platycephalidae) 























Black pomfret Halwayah 
21 Argyrops spinifer (Sparidae) King soldier 
bream 
Andag 







Trout sweetlips Fersh 
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Table 2. The number of active fishers and their nationalities since 
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Table 3. Tickets for i l legal fishing issued during 2001-2017 
against fishers by the Kuwaiti FPA (Source: FPA). 





Valid Kuwaiti 4452 45.6 45.6 45.6 
Non 
Kuwaiti 5218 53.5 53.5 99.1 
Unknown 84 .9 .9 100.0 
Total 9754 100.0 100.0   
Missing  1 .0     




Figure 1. Annual total fish landings in Kuwaiti waters from 1983 to 2016 in 
kgs. (Source:  CSB and the Kuwaiti Authority of Fishery Protection [32]. 
Figure 2. The number of licensed fishers who have been active in Kuwaiti 
waters since 2000. (No data for 2006) Source: [32]. 
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